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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the European Commission's practice of establishing groups of experts 
from the EU member states with a view to identifying and clarifying issues of interpretation 
of directives. This turn towards management of compliance with directives has a number of 
advantages compared to traditional enforcement according to the general EU infringement 
procedure stipulated in Article 258 TFEU. For instance, the Commission can tackle non-
compliance in a broadly inclusive and pre-emptive manner. The method, however, also 
raises a number of policy issues. Specifically, management of compliance implies both 
interpretation and behavioural assessment, i.e., two central powers of the Court of Justice 
according to the general EU infringement procedure. Whereas norm development through 
interpretation has often been analysed in relation to the Court of Justice, it has not been 
comprehensively analysed in relation to the examined groups of experts. It is argued that 
the method may bring about norm harmonisation, norm-setting and internalisation. 
Moreover, because the process outcomes are non-binding they are not supervised by the 
Court of Justice. Thus, a rule of law problem occurs to the potential detriment of the 
member states and the "EU legislator" and in particular the European Parliament. 
                                                          
1 The views expressed are those of the author. This paper is a preliminary draft. Please do not quote without 
prior permission.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Commission has established a number of non-binding enforcement procedures 
concerned with member state interpretation and correct application of EU law. Whereas 
infringement proceedings according to the general EU infringement procedure stipulated in 
Article 258 TFEU are initiated against one member state and remain predominantly elitist, 
the supplementary procedures examined in this paper involve all EU member states. The 
procedures are established on an ad hoc basis and cover a broad spectrum of EU policy 
areas ranging from, for instance, temporary agency work, air safety to law regulating the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the member states.2 This provides the Commission with an exceptional 
possibility to monitor member state compliance. Moreover, it enables the Commission to 
exert influence on the interpretation of EU law and to assess member state application of 
EU law. Significantly, the latter two functions correspond to the Court of Justice's core 
functions according to the general EU infringement procedure.3
This paper analyses the described development in relation to enforcement of directives. It 
proceeds in three sections. The first section discusses some of the shortcomings of the 
general EU infringement procedure. Against this background, section two documents and 
describes the proliferation of expert groups with member state representatives established 
with a view to managing member state compliance with directives. The third section 
analyses the ways in which the Commission's role in managing compliance through expert 
groups, resembles its role according to the general EU infringement procedure. In addition, 
it discusses the advantages in terms of effectiveness of supplementing traditional 
enforcement with management of compliance. In addition, the section problematises the 
  
                                                          
2 See e.g. Report from the Commission – 27th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law 
(2009), p. 5, and Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM/2008/840 final. 
3 In case T‑258/06, Germany v Commission [2010] ECR I-nyr, the General Court reaffirmed that “according 
to the system embodied in Articles 226 EC to 228 EC, the rights and duties of Member States may be 
determined and their conduct appraised only by a judgment of the Court of Justice”. This was already 
established by the Court of Justice in joined cases 142/80 and 143/80 Essevi and Salengo [1981] ECR 1413, 
paras 15 and 16, and Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-5449, para 45. 
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Commission's turn towards management of compliance. Clearly, member state compliance 
is in the general interest of the EU. However, the procedures as well as the centralization 
and norm assimilation potentially brought about by the procedures are not transparent. 
Moreover, because the process outcomes are non-binding they are not supervised by the 
Court of Justice. Thus a rule of law problem occurs to the potential detriment of the 
member states, the "EU legislator" and in particular the European Parliament, individuals 
and legal entities. 
 
1. LIMITATIONS OF THE GENERAL EU INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURE 
Clearly, member state compliance is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of EU law. By 
contrast, non-compliance prevents the rationale of the internal market to materialize and it 
has short and long term implications and costs for business. Non-compliance may in 
addition have consequences for the further development of the EU as a political and 
economic union as it may deter member state governments from taking on further and 
deeper commitments.4 Similarly, it hampers the individual rights of citizens.5 The 
establishment of a European citizenship, what Advocate General Colomer called a 
European status civitatis,6
One of the core roles attributed to Commission in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is 
to monitor member state compliance with EU law.
 is at the heart of the EU as a political Union. Thus compliance in 
this area of law, for instance, is central to the credibility of the EU polity as something 
more than an economic community.  
7
                                                          
4 Compare GW Downs, D Rocke, and P N Barsoom ‘Is the Good News about Compliance Good News for 
Cooperation?’ (1996) IO 50, 379–406. 
 According to the general EU 
infringement procedure stipulated in Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, the Commission can seek 
5 Significantly, citizenship creates justiciable rights because of the Court of Justice’s coupling of citizenship 
of the Union and the right to equal treatment. 
6 Opinion of Advocate Colomer in Case C-258/04, Office national de l’emploi (ONEM) vs. Ioannis Ioannidis 
[2005] I-08275, para 46. 
7 Article 17 TEU. 
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a declaration by the Court of Justice that a member state has failed to apply, implement and 
enforce EU law and eventually request the Court of Justice to award pecuniary sanctions.8 
This procedure has proven a robust tool against infringements both during the pre-judicial 
stages where the vast majority of cases are terminated and also in cases before the Court of 
Justice.9 Member state governments do value genuine compliance as evidenced by the fact 
that they have strengthened the Commission's enforcement powers over time.10
The procedure laid down in Article 258 TFEU comprises two consecutive stages, the pre-
litigation stage of an administrative nature and the contentious stage before the Court. The 
purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the member state concerned an 
opportunity to comply with its obligations or to avail itself of its right to defend itself 
against the complaints made by the Commission.
 The 
Maastricht Treaty introduced financial sanctions against repetitive infringements. In 
addition, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a fast-track sanctioning mechanism targeting failure 
to notify member state measures transposing a directive. It also reinforced Article 260 
TFEU against repetitive infringements by relieving the Commission of its obligation to 
issue a reasoned opinion. Perhaps more importantly, the Commission's enforcement powers 
were broadened substantially in scope as the former treaty pillar structure was brought to an 
end by the Lisbon Treaty. Thus the Commission in its role as guardian of the treaties 
appears a noticeably stronger supervisor than it was prior to the Lisbon Treaty.  
11
                                                          
8 L. Prete and B. Smulders, The Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings (2010 CML Rev.), S. Andersen, 
Procedural Overview and Substantive Comments on Articles 226 and 228 EC (2009, Yearbook of European 
Law 2008, Vol. 27). 
 The fact that the pre-litigation procedure 
allows the member state to voluntarily put an end to an infringement is of great practical 
significance as mentioned above. In addition, the pre-litigation stage ensures a clearly 
9 According to Report from the Commission, 27th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law 
(2009), COM/2010/538 final, around 77 percent of complaints were closed before the first formal step in an 
infringement proceeding at the end of 2009. Ca. 12 percent of the total were closed before the reasoned 
opinion and around ca. 7 percent before a ruling from the Court of Justice.  
10 Moreover, they have continued to broaden the scope of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction. See Peter Biering, 
“Has the Court of Justice ever taken Integration too far?”  in (Henning Koch et al.) Europe. The New Legal 
Legal Realism. Essays in Honour of Hjalte Rasmussen (DJØF, 2010). 
11 Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 305, paragraph 13; Case C-1/00 Commission v France 
[2001] ECR I-9989, paragraph 53, and Case C-362/01, Commission v Ireland, paras 15-16.  
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defined dispute before the Court of Justice.12 It is well established case law that an action 
for infringement can only be based on the arguments and pleas in law already set out in the 
reasoned opinion.13
 
 This in turn reflects that the Court of Justice does not draw up legal 
opinions. It rules on the actual facts of the main action. Hence, the subject matters of 
infringements cases are inherently very concrete. For these reasons pursuing individual 
infringements according to the general infringement procedure is resource-intensive. 
Moreover, genuine compliance is complicated to establish and thus to monitor. First, it 
requires in-depth knowledge of the national instruments adopted with a view to ensuring 
the effectiveness of directives. Second, what constitutes correct interpretation and 
application of EU law is often contestable. Enforcement of directives thus requires both 
close scrutiny and policy decision-making. Third, as discussed above, infringement 
proceedings are inherently case-specific. Fourth, although other member states can 
intervene if the Commission decides to refer a case to the Court of Justice, infringement 
proceedings overall are not inclusive in nature.  
2. MANAGEMENT OF COMPLIANCE THROUGH EXPERT GROUPS 
2.1 Different Types of Implementation Expert Groups  
According to Article 288 TFEU a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each member state to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities 
the choice of form and methods. One of the strengths of directives is that they are 
implemented within the framework of the national legal systems. However directives also 
pose a number of challenges for the member state and especially so concerning the results 
to be achieved. Directives can be implemented into national law completely or incorporated 
by reference to the directive and if possible, accompanied by an administrative guidance. 
Incorporating directives into domestic law verbatim is no guarantee for compliance though, 
as the member states still have to apply and enforce the directives on a day-to-day basis. 
                                                          
12 Case C-362/01, Commission v Ireland, para 17. 
13 Case C‑210/91 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I‑6735, para 10. 
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Compliance may prove particularly complicated when directives and their policy objectives 
are formulated in general and unquantifiable terms. Then again, seemingly specific, precise 
and clear EU provisions may also prove ambiguous. Significantly, this leaves member 
states open to individual complaints as well as to Commission infringements proceedings. 
Despite the advantages of directives in terms of flexibility and proportionality, directives 
may thus at the same time create legal uncertainty for the member states in the 
implementation phase. 
In the light of the discussed limitations of the general infringement proceedings and the 
particular challenges (in addition to benefits) posed by directives, it is no surprise that the 
Commission has examined ways to enforce EU law other than the general infringement 
procedure. Notably, the Commission has taken a range of initiates targeting improved 
application of EU law in the member states.14 The Commission's strategies include 
“preventive measures, including increased focus on implementation and enforcement issues 
in impact assessments, improved implementation planning on new legislation, creating 
implementation networks and assisting Member States with correlation tables”.15 As part 
of this strategy the Commission endeavours to manage compliance with certain directives 
through expert groups.16
An example of this is the working group entitled the Capital Requirements Directive 
Transposition Group (CRDTG) set up by the Commission with a view to ensuring 
consistent implementation of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD).
  
17
                                                          
14 'A Europe of Results', COM(2007) 502. 
 The group is 
composed of member state representatives, business stakeholders and the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors. Among other things, the group addresses the accuracy of 
15 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Third strategic review of Better Regulation in the 
European Union, COM/2009/15 final, para IV, 3. 
16 Report from the Commission, 27th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2009) 
COM(2010) 538. 
17 Commission Decision of 5 November 2003 establishing the European Banking Committee (OJ L 2004, L 
3/36). Described in Commission Staff Working Document, “Situation in Different Sectors” - Accompanying 
document to the Report from the Commission, 27th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU 
Law (2009) COM(2010) 538, para 9.2.1.2 (Report on work done in 2009), para 9.2.2.2., p. 280, and  
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the transposition and whether provisions are adequately implemented, based in particular 
on the outcomes of CRDTG.18 The Commission's Internal Market and Services Directorate 
General (DG MARKT) has established an interactive website called Your Questions on 
Legislation (YQOL) where firms, trade associations and public organisations and other 
stakeholders can submit questions relating to the single market.19 Notably, the CRDTG's 
answers are made publicly available on the dedicated webpage. One advantage of this 
approach is of course that individuals have access to information and encouraged by the 
answers may want to challenge member states before domestic courts. Another advantage is 
that the Commission can make available guidance to the member states responsible for 
national implementation of the directive. On the webpage the Commission explicitly states 
that the service does not cover the application of legislative acts by member states or their 
interpretation. Thus, the Commission acknowledges the prerogatives of the Court of Justice 
according to Article 19 TEU to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties the law is observed.20 However, the distinction between guidance and 
interpretation can be somewhat ambiguous. This is illustrated by a response from the UK 
HM Treasury addressed to the Commission, in which the UK comments that it is of the 
understanding that the expert group "exists to provide interpretation of the Directive rather 
than formal guidance", and suggests that the Commission reflects further upon this 
option.21
                                                          
18 2006 Activity Report from the European Banking Committee: 
>http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/ebc/ebc-activity-report_en.pdf <. 
  
19 http://ec.europa.eu/yqol/index.cfm. More specifically, the questions and answers concern the Capital 
Requirements Directive, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, the Electronic Money Directive 
and the Payment Services Directive. 
20 See the case-law cited in footnote 3 on the division of powers between the Commission and the Court of 
Justice according to the general infringement procedure. See also S. Andersen, 'The European Commission's 
Quest for Strengthened Powers of Enforcement', Paper prepared for the 4th Convention of Central and East 
European International Studies Association (CEEISA), University of Tartu, Estonia, 25 – 27 June 2006, 
>http://tinyurl.com/669gyxu< accessed on 20 January 2011. 
21 UK Response to the Commission on the Mortgage Funding Expert Group and Mortgage Industry and 
Consumers Expert Group Reports (February 2007), >http://tinyurl.com/5sa2knc< accessed on 19 January 
2011. 
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Another type of expert group is composed exclusively of national officials representing the 
member states. In terms of composition, this type of group is similar to the Council 
working groups and COREPER. The notion “expert group” however indicates that the 
work is less about policy making and more about problem solving. The member states are 
thus providing expertise on the application of EU law and as suggested by the rhetoric, the 
method is one of cooperation. An example of the latter type of expert group is the Expert 
Group on the implementation of the Services Directive set up by the Commission. In 
addition to the bilateral meetings between the Commission and the member states, the 
Expert Group discusses specific questions pertaining to the implementation of the 
directive.22 The purpose is twofold, namely to examine the member states' interpretation of 
the directives and whether they are consistent and, in addition, to assemble member state 
accord for priorities for action.23 The remainder of section 2 will examine the second type 
of group of experts composed solely of member state representatives in more detail looking 
specifically at the group of experts concerned with implementation  of the Directive on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the member states (the Residence Directive).24
 
 
2.2 The Expert Group on the Implementation of the Residence Directive 
Poor transposition of the Residence Directive prompted the Commission to initiate 
infringement proceedings against 19 member states between June 2006 and February 2007 
alone. The Commission accounts for this in a 2008 report in which it also provides an 
overview of the transposition of the directive and its day-to-day application by the member 
                                                          
22 Commission Staff Working Document, “Situation in Different Sectors” - Accompanying document to the 
Report from the Commission, 27th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2009) 
COM(2010) 538, para 9.2.1.2 (Report on work done in 2009). 
23 Ibid. The aim and work of the group is set out by the Commission on page 46 ff. in Annex 1 to Report […] 
>http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/aar/aar2007/doc/markt_annex1.pdf <. 
24 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 
30.4.2004, p. 77–123). 
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states.25 The report also sets out the Commissions endeavours to develop supplementary 
methods to bring about member state compliance. Among other initiatives, the Commission 
has established a group of experts from member states “to identify difficulties and clarify 
issues of interpretation of the Directive”.26
This group of experts has singled out central issues that require clarification including 
questions pertaining to criminality and abuse. According to case-law the application of EU 
law does not extend to cover abusive practices.
  
27 In addition, Article 35 in the Residence 
Directive explicitly stipulates that member states may adopt the necessary measures to 
refuse, terminate or withdraw any right conferred by the directive in the case of abuse of 
rights. The risk is that member states apply a broad interpretation of the notion of abuse 
thereby mitigating the individual rights anchored in the directive. Compliance in this aspect 
is particularly difficult to monitor by the Commission from Brussels because the member 
states enjoy a margin of discretion (within the limits imposed by the Treaty, of course) and 
given that the Commission does not have access to the facts of specific cases. The 
Commission faces similar problems when supervising the implementation and application 
of member state safeguards based on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health.28 Implementation of the Residence Directive has proven complicated as evidenced 
by the polemics concerning France's deportation of Roma EU citizens.29 The Commission 
has put infringement proceedings on a halt allowing France an opportunity to demonstrate 
that it bases expulsion orders on a specific individual examination of each case.30
                                                          
25 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 
2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, COM/2008/840 final. 
 This 
26 Ibid. 
27 See e.g. C‑212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I‑1459, para 24 and case-law cited. 
28 Chapter VI of the Residence Directive allows member states to restrict the right of EU citizens and their 
family members on grounds of public policy or public security.  
29 The decision by France to expel from its territory Roma EU citizens from Romania and Bulgaria prompted 
the Commission to initiate an exchange between the Commission and the French authorities on the 
transposition and application of EU law and the Residence Directive. Specifically, the Commission was of 
the opinion that France had not transposed the Residence Directive in national law in a manner that rendered 
those rights completely effective (Letter from the Commission on file with the author). 
30 Letter from the Commission.  
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approach whereby the Commission effectively circumvents the burden of proof was 
politically feasible because of the particular circumstances of the specific case. According 
to Article 258 TFEU though, the Commission must prove the existence of an 
infringement.31
The priority areas set out by the Commission in its 2008 report pertaining to criminality and 
abuse reflected several member states' concerns and the Council supported the idea of 
reinforcing member state compliance with the Residence Directive through a group of 
experts. Thus, in 2008 the Council requested the Commission to provide “guidelines for the 
interpretation of that Directive early in 2009 and to consider all other appropriate and 
necessary proposals and measures”.
 Consequently, the Commission cannot generally rely on the member states 
substantiating compliance at the Commission's request.  
32 In addition, at a Justice and Home Affairs Council 
meeting in 2009 the Council endorsed the Commission's pledge to issue guidelines with 
information and assistance pertaining to member state compliance with a view to “facilitate 
effective application of the Directive”.33 The UK moreover asked that the Commission 
should set out consequences when the responsibilities under the Residence Directive were 
not met.34
The European Parliament has likewise been an ardent supporter of the Commission in its 
attempts to develop supplementary means to ensure member state compliance with the 
Residence Directive.
  
35 In 2007, it called on the Commission to make a detailed member 
state compliance assessment of the Residence Directive.36
                                                          
31 The member state in turn must contest substantively and in detail the information produced and the 
consequences thereof. See e.g. Case C-272/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 4875, para 21. 
 The European Parliament 
32 Press release 2908th meeting of the Council, Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 27 and 28 November 
2008, 16325/1/08 REV 1 (Presse 344), pp. 27-28.  
33 Press release, 2927th Council meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 26 and 27 February 2009, 
6877/09 (Presse 51), p. 10.   
34 House of Lords Written Ministerial Statements 5 March 2009, Volume No. 708, Part No. 42, 
>http://tinyurl.com/5vweych< accessed on 23 January 2011.  
35 Resolution of the European Parliament of 2 April 2009 on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC 
(2008/2184(INI)). 
36 Resolution of 15 November 2007 on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC, OJ C 282 E, 6.11.2008, p. 
428. 
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endorsed the Commission proposal to draw up interpretative guidelines and also 
recommended that the Commission should monitor compliance with its guidelines. It 
furthermore proposed a range of specific methodologies to ensure member state 
implementation including that the Commission should develop “guidelines with common 
criteria in relation to the minimum amount regarded as "sufficient resources" and to clarify 
on which basis Member States should take into account “the personal situation of the 
person concerned” under Article 8(4) of Directive 2004/38/EC” and “develop in its 
guidelines a uniform interpretation mechanism of the normative categories of "public 
policy", "public security" and "public health", and to clarify how taking account of 
considerations such as residence period, age, state of health, family and economic 
situation, social and cultural integration, and links with the country of origin, are relevant 
for the expulsion decision provided for in Article 28(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC.”37 
Following up on its recommendation that the Commission should monitor compliance with 
its guidelines, the European Parliament moreover suggested that the Commission should go 
as far as setting a deadline for the implementation of the (non-binding) guidelines, after 
which infringement proceedings would be brought.38
As demonstrated, the Commission's initiative to establish a group of experts concerned with 
member state compliance with the Residence Directive enjoys a high degree of support 
both from the Council and the European Parliament. This support is a prerequisite for the 
method's effectiveness given that the procedure and the procedural outcomes are non-
binding. Importantly, the support strengthens the working group's authority and adds to the 
out-out legitimacy.  
 The latter proposal thus suggests a 
twinning of general interpretative guidance and infringement proceedings according to 
Article 258 TFEU. Finally the European Parliament proposed a mutual evaluation system 
essentially similar in method to the group of member state experts on implementation that 
the Commission has since established.  
 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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3. MANAGING COMPLIANCE WITH DIRECTIVES: EFFECT S AND 
IMPLICATIONS  
3.1 Why the Commission's Role Resemble its Role According to the General 
Infringement Procedure  
From the outset, the Commission's role in the examined implementation group of experts 
composed of the Commission and member state expert appears rather different from the 
Commission's role according to the general infringement procedure. Most notably, 
infringement proceedings are directed at one member state at a time. The initial 
correspondence is elitist and it remains confidential despite of the individual complaints in 
this regard and the criticism voiced by the European Parliament, by some of the member 
states and in the literature on Article 258 TFEU.39 This confidentiality allows member 
states to enter informal exchanges of views with the Commission and to discuss solutions 
with a view to complying. The disadvantage of elitism and thus confidentiality, however, is 
that specific cases do not become comprehensive learning opportunities for other member 
states. Moreover, although the Commission may enquire member states about compliance 
matters the general infringement procedure does not comprise any sort of monitoring 
mechanism, i.e., supervision takes place on an ad hoc basis.40
                                                          
39 See e.g. Joined Cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P, Sweden v Association de la presse 
internationale ASBL (API) and European Commission (C-514/07), Association de la presse internationale 
ASBL (API) v European Commission (C-528/07), European Commission v Association de la presse 
internationale ASBL (API) (C-532/07) [2010], ECR I-nyr and M. Smith, Centralised Enforcement, 
Legitimacy and Good Governance (Routledge, 2010). 
 Thus, although the 
Commission at times initiates clusters of proceedings against member states, the general 
infringement cannot function as a method to examine in a comprehensive manner exactly 
how the member states interpret and implement specific provisions of EU law. By contrast, 
this is one of the core qualities of groups of experts concerned with implementation. 
Significantly, managing compliance through groups of experts allows the Commission to 
sort out concrete legal obligations and to assess how the member states interpret, 
implement, apply and enforce them. At the same tine, there are resemblances between the 
40 Individual complaints to the Commission constitute an important source of information. See Jonas Tallberg, 
European Governance and Supranational Institutions—Making States Comply (Routledge, 2003). 
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Commission's powers and means according to the two types of procedures. Notably, the 
Commission relies heavily on learning, persuasion and bargaining in both. This should be 
understood against the background that although the Commission may refer a member state 
to the Court of Justice, it lacks actual, binding steering capacity.  
A European Union based on the rule of law, but 'which lacks all forms of physical 
coercion'41, cannot meaningfully claim authority without participant collaboration through a 
minimum of compliance. There is a correlation between this lack of ultimate regime 
authority and the institutional powers of the Commission under Articles 258/60 TFEU. The 
political conditions underlying these regime features resemble the lack of steering capacity 
sometimes used to explain the emergence of governance modes of steering. In the same 
vein, the member states are not in a hierarchical relationship with the Commission 
according to the general infringement procedure, although the Commission may initiate and 
advance infringement proceedings and request the Court of Justice to impose sanctions on a 
defaulting member state. For the present discussion of the Commission's tools of 
enforcement, it should be born in mind that the Commission possesses no general 
institutional powers of negative sanction.42 Whether an infringement exists in the first place 
is for the Court to establish.43
                                                          
41 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ’Wilberforce Lecture’ 1992 Common Market Law Review 29, pp. 213-227, p. 216.  
  A threat of fines is thus dependent on, first, the Court of 
Justice establishing an infringement and, second, the Court of Justice making an 
independent decision to award sanctions. There exists no guarantee that the Court of Justice 
will meet a Commission request for fines due to the Court of Justice's unfettered powers in 
this regard. For these reasons, a warning or a threat under Article 260 TFEU is less potent 
than is often assumed in literature. Interestingly, a reasoned opinion of the High Authority 
under Article 88 ECSC was of a binding nature and could only be challenged by the 
member state before the Court of Justice. Considering Articles 258 TFEU and 88 ECSC 
together, the procedures' main objectives are identical, namely to obtain an amicable 
agreement between the Commission working in the general interest of the EU and the 
42 The Commission merely possesses warning powers. 
43 Article 260 TFEU. 
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member state through negotiation44 and 'primarily, to put an end to the failure to comply 
with Community law'.45
With the obligation to pursue friendly agreements according to the general EU infringement 
procedure, the Commission appears a facilitator with procedural powers of 'hierarchical 
control'
 Yet, in comparison, the changes in the Commission's institutional 
powers are profound. Significantly, the relationship between the supervisor and supervisees 
takes a more heterarchical form under Articles 258/60 TFEU. In considering the 
procedures' identical purposes it is apparent that it is merely the method that has changed 
character. Law structured problem-resolution is put before supranational governing. Article 
258 TFEU, therefore, marks an important shift away from a steering based approach in 
which the Commission could issue directives to the member states. 
46 rather than a steering centre. At the same time, the Commission's absolute 
discretion regarding whether to initiate and forward proceedings allows room for less 
legalistic ways of approaching non-compliance. In such a process- rather than command-
based enforcement regime, the significance of the main actors' relative powers is down-
played and the parties' problem-solving capacity through negotiation is accentuated. Under 
Article 258 TFEU, 'hierarchical control' is combined with a significant degree of autonomy 
to implement and enforce EU law enjoyed by the member states, which are primary 
responsible thereof.47
                                                          
44 T-309/97, The Bavarian Lager Company Ltd v Commission [1999] II-03217, para 46.  
 Such a functional division of competence and the procedural features 
of Article 258 TFEU share several traits central to governance. First, the Commission is 
intended to negotiate compliance solutions with member states bilaterally and offer the 
necessary legal and technical assistance. Second, in addition to the political and interpretive 
deliberation taking place, the parties engage in fact-finding and assessment. Thus, formally 
and informally the general infringement procedure depends to a large degree upon an 
45 C-276/99 Germany v Commission [2001] I-8055, para 25. 
46 Expression borrowed from Renate Mayntz, ‘From Government to Governance: Political Steering in Modern 
Societies’, Summer Academy on IPP: Wuerzberg, 7-11 September 2003, p. 6. Can be found at 
www.ioew.de/governance/english/veranstaltungen/Summer_Academies/SuA2Mayntz.pdf. The author is 
concerned with governance generally and not with the EU infringement procedure specifically. 
 
47 See, e.g., the answer given by Mr. Fischler on behalf of the Commission to Written Question P-1052/2000, 
OJ 72 E, 6/3/2001, pp. 17-18. 
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'iterative process of deliberation and knowledge-creation'.48 Third, the absolute discretion 
of the Commission throughout the infringement procedure has allowed the Commission to 
experiment with alternative or complementary methods of bringing about compliance in 
addition to the general infringement procedure. This way, the general EU infringement 
procedure bears some resemblance with non-binding regulatory modes of governance. The 
most general and significant trait is the scope for process and the procedural framework 
which allows for rule-structured influence on actor behaviour.49 Because the administrative 
phase of Article 258 TFEU is characterised by secrecy and because the Court of Justice is 
not foreseen to review any type of formal compliance agreement reached between the 
member state and the Commission, the pre-judicial phase puts emphasis on enabling 
action.50
There persists one significant difference between traditional enforcement proceedings 
according to Article 258 TFEU and management of compliance through groups with 
national experts on implementation not addresses in this section. Specifically, the 
Commission has judicial recourse according to the former procedure. This difference is 
somewhat academic though given that the Commission may always initiate proceedings 
against a member state. Indeed the European Parliament suggested that the Commission 
should combine the general infringement procedure with non-binding guidelines to bolster 
 This is significant to the day-to-day problem-solving capacity of the EU. In this 
sense, informal and formalized prejudicial dialogue under the general infringement 
procedure is to quite some length comparable in terms of methodology to the processes 
taking place in group of experts on implementation despite the difference in terms of 
composition.  
                                                          
48 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European Union’, 2003 
European Law Review 28:6, pp. 814-839, pp. 823 ff. The author is not concerned with the general EU 
infringement procedure according to Article 258 TFEU. 
49 Compare Gunnar Folke Schuppert, ‘Governance im Spiegel der Wissenschaftsdisziplin’ in (Ed.) Gunnar 
Folke Schuppert, Governance-Forschung. Vergewisserung über Stand und Entwicklungslinien, (Baden-
Baden, Nomos, 2005), pp. 371-469. The author is not concerned with the general EU infringement 
procedure according to Article 258 TFEU. 
50 Considerations to domestic politics, actual or potential domestic court proceedings and diplomatic relations 
in the EU would significantly narrow down the scope for finding amicable settlements if there was no 
confidentiality. The ensuing economic and political cost would be momentous. 
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compliance with the Residence Directive.51
 
 As will be discussed in section 3.3, the 
potential and actual twinning of the procedures makes the Commission's role in managing 
compliance potentially much more vigorous than it appears at first sight. 
3.2 The Types of Non-Compliance Dealt with in the Implementation Group 
The examined type of procedure in the expert group likewise has a number of traits often 
used to characterise governance modes, although this is far from being readily defined 
notion.52 Thus, the procedure allows for flexibility, peer-review, peer-learning and not least 
informal exchange of views with the Commission and the member states. Significantly, the 
procedural outcomes are non-binding. This makes the procedure particularly attractive from 
a member state point of view; not least in relation to implementation of directives. The type 
of learning that can take place and the scope for member state differences will of course 
depend on the type of directive at hand. As mentioned, directives are binding, as to the 
result to be achieved, upon each member state to which it is addressed, but leave the choice 
of form and methods to the national authorities.53 This entails that the member state shall 
adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that the directives are fully effective, in 
accordance with the objective that the directives pursue. Thus, there is a clear division of 
power between the EU and the member states when it comes to adoption of transposition 
measures with a view to complying with any given directive. As pointed out by the Court 
of Justice, the types of obligations which directives impose on the member states vary 
significantly.54
                                                          
51 Resolution of 15 November 2007 on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC, OJ C 282 E, 6.11.2008, p. 
428.  
 Certain directives involve member state legislative measures and require 
that compliance with those measures is subject of review be that of a judicial or 
administrative nature. By contrast, other directives require member states to take the 
52 Stafano Bartolini, An Introduction in (Eds. Adrienne Héritier and Martin Rhodes) ’New Modes of 
Governance in Europe. Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy’ (2011, Palgrave Studies in European union 
Politics). 
53 Article 288 TFEU. 
54 Case C-60/01, Commission v France, [2002] ECR I-5679, paras 25-28. 
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necessary measures to ensure that certain broadly framed objectives are attained and at the 
same time leave the member states some leeway in deciding the nature of the measures to 
be taken. Then again, other directives require the member states to obtain very precise, 
specific or even quantifiable results within clearly established deadlines.55
In a 2007 communication, the Commission sets out what it considers some of the reasons 
behind the many pending infringement files. Among the reasons the Commission points out 
that member States i) may pay insufficient attention to the correct interpretation and 
application of the law, ii) may be late with implementation work and the communication of 
national transposition measures, iii) may encounter difficulties of interpretation and choice 
of procedural options, and/or iv) may transpose a directive or interpret a regulation in a way 
that does not comply with the EU measure in question.
  
56 The first two situations relate to 
the member states' effort and willingness to implement in a timely manner. Moreover, non-
compliance in those situations may also come down to internal organization, domestic 
political hindrances and the resources allocated to implementation.57 These types of non-
compliance essentially reflect procrastination, lack of commitment and poor internal 
organisation. The examined group of experts may of course put pressure on defaulting 
member states in this regard. However, the group aims at the latter types of reasons for con-
compliance (i.e., iii and iv).58
                                                          
55 Ibid. The Court of Justice provides examples of the different types of directives.   
 Concerning the latter two types of reasons for (alleged) non-
compliance there is a considerable scope for processes other than merely compelling 
compliance through, for instance, peer-pressure. In this specific context, peer-learning does 
not relate necessarily to best practices, but also to how to implement directives correctly. 
Notably, the group of experts deals with the interpretation of binding law. The subsequent 
56 'A Europe of Results', COM(2007) 502, p. 4. 
57 Situation i) and ii) resemble what Falkner et al. in their study on compliance categorize as ‘a world of 
domestic politics’, and ‘a world of neglect’. The authors operate with a third category; ‘a world of law 
observance’. G Falkner, O Treib, M Hartlapp, S Leiber, Complying with Europe: EU Harmonisation and 
Soft Law in the Member States (Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
58 Similarly, the “Expert Group on the Implementation of the Services Directive” aims at ensuring “a similar 
level of understanding by all the Member States of the work required and the priorities for action”. 
Commission Staff Working Document ’Situation in the Different Sectors’, Accompanying document to the 
Report from the Commission 27th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2009), 
SEC/2010/1143 final, section 9.2.1.2. 
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section will consider what implications this has for the member states' autonomy when 
implementing directives. 
 
3.3 Interpretation or Centralization and Norm-Assimilation 
3.3.1 
The Commission has developed a host of different types of nonbinding, problem-solving 
procedures with member state representatives from various levels of domestic government 
to complement its direct enforcement actions. Thus there is a more general turn towards 
enabling,
The Policy Space Reserved to Member States when Implementing Directives 
59 facilitating60 and multilateral61
                                                          
59 Package meetings, including technical guidance. 
 methods used to obtain better compliance rates, 
which has emerged through Commission institutional practice. Significantly, this picture of 
a multilayered co-operative web corresponds to core organisational traits of governance. It 
also suggests that enforcement with EU law at this point calls for additional and more 
refined methods than merely compelling compliance by threat of court proceedings and 
pecuniary penalties. The on-line problem solving network SOLVIT for instance allows 
member states to work together to solve problems caused by the misapplication of internal 
market law without legal proceedings. Specifically, it provides a mechanism to handle 
concrete problems that citizens and businesses experience. The group of member state 
experts on implementation examined in this paper is somewhat different in it does not 
involve citizens, business representatives or stakeholders other than the member states. The 
composition rather mirrors the Council. The group of experts is not intended to tackle 
specific instances of non-compliance. Instead it deals with general problems of non-
compliance and how member states transpose, implement and enforce EU law. Moreover, 
the group of experts investigates and tackles compliance issues pre-emptively. Thus, the 
implementation expert group engages in interpretation concerning issues that in principle 
60 SOLVIT programme establishing administrative cooperation to resolve specific citizen problems within the 
Internal Market. 
61 Peer review. 
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belong to the member states when implementing directives. This may come at a cost for the 
autonomy reserved to the member states according to Article 288 TFEU.   
Zürn has developed a theoretical framework, which accounts for legal regimes beyond the 
nation-state displaying a high degree of compliance. Taking the European Union as a 
successful government construction, the author acknowledges the significance of traditional 
Principal-Agent enforcement means such as 'effective monitoring mechanisms and 
sanctions'.62 However, an additional and central element is that of legalization understood 
as, on the one hand, juridification and, on the other, legal and civil internalization. The 
latter refers to supremacy and direct effect. These processes are seen to be in a dynamic 
cycle.63 Clearly, supremacy and direct effect are principal traits of the aggregate 
enforcement picture and they do to a significant degree explain the level of compliance 
displayed by the EU. Juridification concerns rule requirements such as 'clarity, pertinence, 
stringency, adaptability and a high degree of consistency, both within themselves and in 
relation to other laws'64 and the function of delegation of authority. Falling back on Abbott 
et al. the concept of juridification is taken to cover legal obligation, rule precision and third 
party delegation of implementing, supervisory and adjudicative power.65 Those authors' 
contention is that the EU generally displays a high degree of obligation, precision and 
delegation. In their terminology a 'precise rule specifies clearly and unambiguously what is 
expected by a state … (in terms of both the intended objective and the means to achieve 
it)'.66 Often, but not necessarily always, such precise rules set out the conditions of 
application in detail.67
                                                          
62 Michael Zürn, ‘Introduction: Law and Compliance at Different Levels’ in (Eds) Zürn, Michael and Christian 
Joerges, Law and Governance in Postnational Europe, Compliance beyond the Nation-State (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), see intro. 
 Zürn draws a link between both precision and delegation and the 
63 Ibid, pp. 24-25. 
64 Ibid, p. 23.  
65 Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal, 
‘The Concept of Legalization’ 2000 IO 54:3, pp. 401-419. 
66 Abbott et al. (2000), p. 412. 
67 Abbott et al. (2000), p. 413.  
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question of ambiguity.68 The central argument is that a high degree of autonomy and power 
conferred to authorities in order to undertake interpretation and adjudication, but also fact 
finding and implementation, corresponds to the higher degree of juridification displayed.69
The member state commitments covered by Articles 258/60 TFEU are binding hard law 
and clearly impose constraints on member state behaviour thus hinting at some stringency. 
The corresponding enforcement procedure is ultimately characterised by a high degree of 
delegation in that the Court of Justice is empowered to hand down binding judgements.
  
70 
Both the compulsory nature of the substantive law and the mentioned delegation to the 
Court of Justice points towards a command centred approach and it suggests some steering 
capacity. Nonetheless, the criteria of rule precision and also the type of powers delegated to 
the Commission and the Court of Justice need some further consideration in the specific EU 
context. One sort of ambiguity is characteristic of most international treaties as well as EU 
law, reflecting the fact that obligations have been negotiated in a diplomatic setting. 
Because the EU is a supranational law regime with supremacy, this ambiguity may be 
politically necessary in order to compensate for the member states' increasing loss of 
regulatory autonomy. Even if one understands the notion of compliance in a neutral fashion 
as 'a state of conformity between an actor's [state's] behaviour and a specified rule',71 
compliance can often take numerous forms. Frequently, there remains a margin for 
interpretation. Absolute specificity is rare. This is a matter of substantive flexibility.72
                                                          
68 Michael Zürn (2004), p. 23. 
 Thus, 
69 Michael Zürn (2004), p. 24. 
70 See generally Abbott et al. (2000).  
71 Kal Raustiale and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’ in 
(Eds) Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, Handbook of International Relations 
(London, SAGE, 2002), p. 539. 
72 See Christian Joerges, ‘Compliance Research in Legal Perspectives’ in (Eds) Zürn, Michael and Christian 
Joerges, Law and Governance in Postnational Europe, Compliance Beyond the Nation-State (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) on legal indeterminacy.  
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even when a law is backed by a sovereign, or when law claims sovereignty, some 
interpretation is required.73
Another and interrelated feature of significance is the responsive nature of EU law towards 
domestic legal and political considerations. The most common legislative form within the 
EU is that of (framework) directives, with a more or less narrowly defined objective. It is, 
however, up to the member state legislator to incorporate it into the domestic legal order, if 
not already observed, and to give effect to it. This is a less intrusive way to integrate 
supranational law into the national legal systems and a method that also has a political 
dimension to it. Whereas, in the words of Majone, 'total harmonization reflects a federalist 
vision of the integration process' and with that a 'federal preemption',
  
74 the EU body of law 
is to a large degree based upon optional and minimum harmonization, the principle of 
mutual recognition,75
                                                          
73 See Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
on legal realism.  
 a range of soft law measures and framework directives. Even in areas 
of exclusive EU competence member states often retain a significant margin for meeting 
their obligations. Whereas the degree of obligation is incontestably high within the EU, the 
element of precision is more subtle. That is to say, the objectives of law can have a 
significant degree of precision and still leave a broad margin of discretion concerning how 
to give law effect. In the specific EU context this flexibility amounts to a substantive virtue 
with a constitutional expression, namely the doctrine of proportionality. Moreover, it has a 
procedural dimension under EU enforcement. Thus the corresponding powers of the 
Commission as well as the Court, as central institutional players and the procedural design 
of the infringement procedure acknowledge the degree of flexibility as to the manner in 
which EU law is given effect. Thus although the EU is characterised by unprecedented 
autonomous powers, there are few examples of powers that can be employed without a high 
degree of appreciation of the member states either directly or indirectly, including in the 
enforcement phase. Audretsch, for instance, notes that it 'is to be regarded as a consequence 
 
74 Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by 
Stealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 70. 
75 Giandomenico Majone (2005), p. 71. 
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of its supervisory task that the Commission … indicates to the best of its ability how an 
infringement can be terminated.'76 However, the Commission cannot give compliance 
directives. This is a consequence of the division of powers foreseen in the Treaty. The 
Court of Justice remains the single authority of legal interpretation and only the Court of 
Justice can appraise member state conduct.77 It is noteworthy that, even in this definitive 
instance (before the Court of Justice), there is an underlying recognition that the manner in 
which EU law is applied is not an EU matter as long as the member states give effect to it. 
The Court of Justice hands down judgements of a declaratory nature78 and it is not assumed 
to possess powers to specify the measures to be taken by a member states.79 When the 
Court has established the failure to comply, the member state determines the action it will 
take to comply.80 Things may be different with what Audretsch denotes 'arrêts educatifs,' 
namely guidance as to 'how the law could be observed'.81
                                                          
76 See H.A.H. Audretsch, Supervision in the European Community Law (Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 
1986), p. 53. Another question is whether there is a legal obligation to do so as, e.g., Advocate General 
Lagrange argues in his opinion in C-7/61 Commission v Italy [1961] ECR 317. 
 This is a more open-ended and 
pragmatic form of communication, which leaves the member state with discretion, or 
flexibility, in the compliance phase ensuing the judgement. Nevertheless, even when 
sanctions are imposed neither the Commission nor the Court of Justice can prescribe how a 
state should comply. The statal autonomy to define the manner in which member states will 
give effect to EU law thus remains intact. Thus, to summarize, a high degree of 
juridification and delegation to autonomous institutions occurs in respect of and in 
interaction with a nucleus of statal self-rule and management.  
77 Cases C-393/98 Ministério Público and António Gomes Valente v Fazenda Pública [2001]ECR I-1327, C-
142 and 143/80 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Essevi SpA and Carlo Salengo [1980] ECR p. 
1413 
78 Opinion of Advocate General Alber in C-260/98 Commission v Greece [2000] I-6537, para 76: ‘proceedings 
for failure to fulfil Treaty obligations seek a declaration of principle on the content of the rules of 
Community law.’ 
79 H.A.H. Audretsch (1986), p. 115. The author, however, maps out legal arguments modifying this strict 
doctrinal assumption.   
80 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Mischo in C-78/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-8195, para 65. 
81 H.A.H. Audretsch (1986), p. 116. The author falls back on a broad interpretation of ex Article 220 EC.  
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3.3.2 
This section puts forward three hypotheses that are theoretically probable, however require 
further empirical substantiation.  The first hypothesis is that the Commission can exert 
substantial power through expert groups because of its influence on the subject matter and 
access to set priorities. Expert group have no power of authoritative interpretation per se. 
The Commission also has no powers of interpretation, as discussed in the above section.
The Commission's Role in Expert Groups and the Potential for (Re-)Negotiating 
Directives 
82 
However, the Commission is an autonomous semi-political institution and one legitimate 
way to pursue its policy objectives is exactly through affecting the interpretation of EU law. 
What the Commission can do generally and in the expert group is to insist on how 
directives should rightfully be interpreted and implemented. In the expert groups the 
Commission benefits from the fact that the member states actually want guidance, and from 
the fact that it appears to have a less hostile role than it does under the general infringement 
procedure. Given that the various member states are likely to have a host of pooled and 
dispersed interests on different components of the Commission text, the Commission is less 
likely to be seen as an absolute promoter of certain member state interests. The 
Commission has its strongest negotiation power with reference to the substantive issues 
raised. A key function of the Commission in the procedure is, therefore, to negotiate hard 
on the components contained in its discussion papers rather than on the stakeholders.83
                                                          
82 See e.g. case T‑258/06, Germany v Commission [2010] ECR I-nyr. 
 The 
Commission can help define and refine the shared norms of the parties, keep them present 
during negotiations and by invoking them restrain the scope for inappropriate claims. 
However, the procedure may well blur the fact that it is perfectly legitimate for a member 
state to insist on a certain interpretation up until the point the Court of Justice rules against 
it. Specifically, the expert group engages in processes of communicating back and forth for 
the purpose of reaching a shared understanding on what constitutes correct interpretation of 
a given provision. This discourse is contained in an on-going relationship (the working 
group), which the stakeholders by and large have an interest in maintaining. Thus, there is a 
83 Compare Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In 
(London, Random House Business Books, 1981). 
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dual interest in the substance as well as the relationship.84
The second hypothesis is that although the type of dialogue taking place in expert groups in 
principle should be about objective interpretation it also entails negotiation. As Joerges 
succinctly asks: "How can you know it is compliance when you see it?"
 This in turn makes hard 
(bargaining) positions less legitimate. 
85 One implication 
is that the policy space reserved for the member states (see section 3.3.1) effectively 
becomes void. Another implication is that the Council members may effectively engage in 
renegotiation of substantive elements of directives. The ensuing norm development is 
however not governed by the normal legislative procedures. As a consequence, the 
European Parliament cannot exert its treaty-based influence as co-legislator. Another 
consequence is that substantive policy developments are outside the control of the Court of 
Justice because the outcomes are non-binding.86 Interestingly, the European Parliament 
seems to suggest that the Commission does know what constitutes compliance in some of 
its commentaries and recommendations to the Commission (see section 2.2) concerning 
enforcement of the Residence Directive. As mentioned, the European Parliament even 
proposed that the Commission should twin its interpretive communications with 
infringement proceeding to bolster the impact of non-binding interpretive communications. 
However, although the European Parliament does not seem to fret the ensuing risk of norm 
development outside its own influence and without judicial review in the specific context of 
compliance with the Residence Directive, it has raised the above mentioned issues and 
specifically the Commission's resulting powers in a case between Germany and the 
Commission concerning public procurement.87
The third hypothesis is that the processes in the group of experts contain a high degree of 
repetition, clarification and gradual alignment, which in turn facilitates internalisation. Thus 
        
                                                          
84 Compare Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981), p. 20. 
85 Christian Joerges, ‘Compliance Research in Legal Perspectives’ in (Eds) Michael Zürn and Christian 
Joerges, Law and Governance in Postnational Europe, Compliance Beyond the Nation-State (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), p. 242. 
86 To this extent, compare case T‑258/06, Germany v Commission [2010] ECR I-nyr. 
87 Case T‑258/06, Germany v Commission [2010] ECR I-nyr. 
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although the policy outcomes are non-binding, they may nonetheless have a significant 
impact on how member states interpret and implement EU law. The meetings form 
dialectical, creative processes of inventing and considering options for reconciling the 
parties' interpretations and interests rather than a 'narrowing the gap between positions'.88 
There is ample room for discussing individual member states' perceptions and interests in 
the process. In terms of negotiation, this has several strengths and suggests why 
compromises are reached and may to a high degree be internalised. First, exchanging 
information and in particular understanding what the other parties say in a supranational 
setting across cultural, linguistic, political traditions is a delicate exercise. Second, this 
cumbersome and repetitive procedure enables each member state to voice all its interests, 
including those which may appear to be of minor significance to other member states, and, 
importantly, enables them to be understood. Third, the procedure implies a high degree of 
participation and the governments thereby get a stake in the finally agreed interpretation.89
 
 
The extent to which the non-binding policy outcomes are internalised needs empirical 
substantiation.  
3.4 The Member States Want Directives and Unity of Application 
As a final point it may be considered whether the turn towards management has come about 
because the member states insist on directives as their preferred regulatory tool and at the 
same time require unity of application. In 2001, a Commission working group advocated 
that regulations should be preferred to directives.90
                                                          
88 Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981), p. 61.  
 The principal difference between 
directives and regulations lies in their scope of application. Whereas regulations are binding 
in their entirety and directly applicable in all member states, directives leave it to the 
national authorities to choose the form and methods to achieve a Community result. The 
Commission's outlook was somewhat in opposition to the EU member states' standpoint 
89 Compare Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981). 
90 Handling the Process of Producing and Implementing Community Rules. Report of the Working Group   
‘Better regulation’ (Group 2c) May 2001 (White Paper on European Governance, Work Area no 2), p. 6.   
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expressed in the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam. According to that protocol: 'directives 
should be preferred to regulations and framework directives to detailed measures' and 
directives should 'leave as much scope for national decision as possible'.91 The 
Commission's contention was however not motivated by considerations of proportionality, 
but of enforceability. High levels of compliance are, the working group contended, not 
merely a matter of enforcement design and powers, but should be seen as closely linked 
with the type of legislative instruments chosen. It further argued, in this regard, that strict 
adherence to the proportionality principle works against the interest of the business 
establishment's interest in that it entails 'a less uniform and more complex legal 
framework.'92
 
 In arguing this way, the Commission established a link between its general, 
i.e., cross-sectoral, argument that regulations often work in the interest of compliance and 
the interests of civil society. It is clear that succinct and immediately binding obligations 
are relatively speaking more easily monitored. However, the choice between directives and 
regulations cannot be regarded as merely a technical matter of enforceability. It is also a 
policy choice. The characteristics of directives as a legislative tool which make them 
complicated to supervise might at the same time be their virtue and their very reason for 
existing. Then again, when discussing pros and cons of directives and regulations, the rule 
of law problems raised in this paper should be factored in. Arguably, directives are 
increasingly managed by expert groups in a manner, which render them somewhat 
comparable to regulations.  
                                                          
91 Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community, paragraphs 6 
and 7. This particular element is left out of Protocol no. 2 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty (OJ C 2010, 
83/206). For a discussion thereof see Bruno de Witte, ‘Legal Instruments and Law-Making in the Lisbon 
Treaty’, in Jacques Ziller et al., The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? 
(2008, Springer), pp. 96. It is beyond the scope of this section to analyze the amendments in relation to the 
issues raised in this paper.    
92 Handling the Process of Producing and Implementing Community Rules. Report of the Working Group 
‘Better regulation’ (Group 2c) May 2001 (White Paper on European Governance, Work Area no 2), p. 11.    
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4. CONCLUSION  
This paper explored the European Commission's practice of establishing groups of experts 
from the EU member states with a view to identifying and clarifying issues of interpretation 
of directives. It was maintained that this turn towards management of compliance with 
directives has a number of advantages compared to traditional enforcement according to the 
general EU infringement procedure stipulated in Article 258 TFEU. For instance, the 
Commission can tackle non-compliance in a broadly inclusive and pre-emptive manner.  
The method however raises a number of policy issues. Specifically, management of 
compliance implies both interpretation and behavioural assessment, i.e., two central powers 
of the Court of Justice according to the general EU infringement procedure. It was argued 
that management of compliance with directives may bring about norm harmonisation, 
norm-setting and internalisation. Consequently, the policy outcomes are likely to encroach 
upon the policy space reserved for member states when implementing directives. Whether 
this indeed happens needs further empirical substantiation. Moreover, because the process 
outcomes are non-binding they are not supervised by the Court of Justice. Thus, a rule of 
law problem occurs to the potential detriment of the member states and the "EU legislator" 
and in particular the European Parliament.  
The Commission has pointed out that regulations in comparison with directives have 
advantages in terms of enforcement and that the application of regulations is more 
transparent, which in turn benefits business stakeholders. Yet, member states by and large 
prefer directives to regulations in accordance with the principle of proportionality. By 
managing implementation with directives, however, the Commission does effectively 
manage to contain the member states' regulatory autonomy to some degree when 
implementing directives. Thus, as a final point, this paper noted that there appears to a 
discrepancy between the member states insistence on directives as their preferred regulatory 
tool and the call for unity of application and the demonstrated practice of managing 
compliance with directives. Whether there is indeed a discrepancy depends on the degree to 
which compliance with directives is managed.  
